Superpower détente during the Nixon-Ford Administration led to the formation of an East-West regime aimed at conflict control and systemic stability. 'Equal Security' was the proclaimed goal. By institutionalizing bipolarity, however, the bilateral US-SU Strategic Arms Limitation Talks actually threatened Western European security, for global security and Alliance security were ultimately incompatible. NATO Europe feared the emergence of a global directorate of the superpowers and became apprehensive that the US would be ready to abandon the cause of Europe and sacrifice European and German unity for the sake of a stable world order. In reaction, NATO Europe sought to shape the SALT process to ensure that equal security applied to all - the Soviet Union, the United States and the European Allies.
This e-book analyses the linkages between SALT, MBFR, NATO and the special Anglo-American nuclear relationship. It also explores how NATO Europe penetrated US decision-making and co-shaped the US SALT agenda and how Scoop Jackson Democrats and NATO Europe aligned to preserve Western block superiority, freezing the SALT II process. Based on recently declassified European archival material, the e-book offers a fresh interpretation of and a 'new look' at SALT.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1;TABLE OF CONTENTS;6 2;PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;8 3;I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I & EUROPEAN SECURITY, 19691972;10 4;1. INTRODUCTION;10 5;2. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: THE PREHISTORY;18 6;3. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, EUROPE AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL;22 7;4. NATO, EUROPE AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE PRELIMINARY SAL TALKS;34 8;5. PRELIMINARY TALKS AND THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS;43 9;6. A LIMITED FIRST AGREEMENT;55 10;7. THE US MODIFIED APPROACH: THE STRUGGLE FOR ADOPTION;61 11;8. THE MAY 20 JOINT DECLARATION: THE COMMON PLATFORM;74 12;9. THE PATH TO MOSCOW: EUROPE AND SALT I;89 13;II. WHAT IS PARITY? EUROPE, SALT II AND THE VLADIVOSTOK AGENDA IN THE ERA NIXON-FORD, 19721976;106 14;1. INTRODUCTION;106 15;2. FROM SALT I TO SALT II: THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL;110 16;3. A NEW BEGINNING: THE PREPARATION OF THE GENEVA TALKS;116 17;4. BEYOND THE PRELIMINARY TALKS: THE MATRIX FOR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL;128 18;5. SALT AND THE YEAR OF EUROPE, 1973;133 19;6. SALT AND THE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR;142 20;7. SALT II AND MBFR;157 21;8. TOWARDS THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, JUNE 1974;173 22;9. PRESIDENT FORD AND THE AVENUE TO VLADIVOSTOK;183 23;10. VLADIVOSTOK: THE SALT II AGREEMENT ILLUSION;194 24;11. NATO, MBFR AND US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE;201 25;12. THE SALT TRACK: CRUISE MISSILES, BACKFIRE AND NATO EUROPE;207 26;13. SALT II: THE LAST STAND OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION;217 27;III. CONCLUSION;229 28;ABBREVIATIONS;240 29;BIBLIOGRAPHY;242 30;INDEX;247
