This work examines the relationship between the rapid technological and economic growth characteristic of high technology districts and their distinct labor market institutions - short job tenures, rapid turnover, flat firm hierarchies, weak internal labor markets, high use of temporary labor, unusual uses of independent contracting, little unionization, unusual employee organization (e. g. , chat groups, and ethnic organization), unequal income, minimal employment discrimination litigation, flexible compensation (especially stock options), and heavy use of immigrants on short-term visas. The author suggests that while these distinctive labor market institutions are somewhat unorthodox and may present legal problems, they play essential roles in high growth.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Chapter 1 The Development of Silicon Valley's High-Velocity Labor Market; Part I The Information Story; Chapter 2 Mobile Employees, Information Spillover, and Trade Secrets; Chapter 3 A New Economic Analysis of Trade Secrets Law From an Economics of Information Perspective; Chapter 4 Information Ownership and Transmission by Mobile Employees: Alternative Economic Approaches; Part II The Flexibility Story; Chapter 5 How Flexible Labor is Hired I: Temporary Help Employees Who Work at One Client ("Permatemps"); Chapter 6 How Flexible Labor is Hired II: Independent Contractors; Chapter 7 H-1B Visas; Part III Labor Market Intermediaries: Information and Flexibility; Chapter 8 Labor Market Intermediaries: Matching Workers to Jobs; Chapter 9 Employee Organization: Networks, Ethnic Organization, New Unions; Part IV Flexible (and Informational) Compensation; Chapter 10 Stock Options: Their Law and Economics; Chapter 11 Market Failure in Retirement Savings and Health Insurance; Part V Inequality; Chapter 12 Employment Discrimination? how a Meritocracy Creates Disparate Labor Market Outcomes Through Demands for Skills at Hiring, Networks of Employees, Entrepreneurial Tendencies;
