Do political institutions significantly influence policy outcomes? If so, how and why do they make a difference? These essays explain why the differences between governments and national voting systems with a premier and those with a president shape the fundamentals of politics and policy choices in the United States and Japan. The authors explain outcomes ranging from national budgetary priorities through nuclear-power regulations and military-security commitments. They show that the political leadership in both countries is in control of policy, but that political institutions explain why the bureaucracies of the two countries receive different missions and operating procedures. This volume is a powerful contribution to the fields of comparative politics, comparative political economy, comparative foreign policy, and rational choice.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Introduction Peter Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins; Part I. Structure and Politics: 2. The structural determinants of electoral cohesiveness: England Japan and the United States Gary W. Cox and Frances M. Rosenbluth; 3. Party provision for personal politics: dividing the vote in Japan Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth; 4. The appearance of power: legislators bureaucrats and the budget process in the United States and Japan Mathew D. McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble; 5. Perceptions and realities of Japanese budgeting Mathew D. McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble; Part II. Politics and Policy: 6. Telecommunications policy: structure, process outcomes Roger G. Noss and Frances M. Rosenbluth; 7. The politics of nuclear power in Japan and the United States Linda Cohen, Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth; 8. The politics of foreign policy in Japan and the United States Peter Cowhey; 9. Coordinating economic policies: a schematic model and some remarks on Japan-US exchange rate politics Haruhiro Fukui and M. Stephen Weatherford; 10. Conclusion Peter Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins.
