"A refreshing look at corporate governance that resonates in the real world. For example, Macey argues that so-called 'independent' directors are not really as independent as they appear and explains why the handpicked members of the boards of directors of publicly held companies often are more attentive to managers' interests than to shareholders' interests. Macey points out that there is something wrong with a corporate-governance system that regularly allows ostensibly independent corporate directors to refuse to permit shareholders to decide for themselves when to sell their own companies. Macey does an excellent job of explaining the legal and political problems that give too much power to incumbent managers and not enough to shareholders and free markets."--Carl Icahn
"Macey's book is must reading for any serious student of corporate governance. He brings his usual keen analyses and fresh insights to a field where unexamined received wisdom and advocacy of me-too 'best practices' have too often been the norm."--John F. Olson, senior partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
"The ambition and achievement of this work is dazzling. Macey leaves no stone unturned in his penetrating examination of the system of American corporate governance. The book will doubtless be an important contribution to the longstanding debate over how best to support the bedrock role that the public corporation plays in the American economy."--Ronald J. Daniels, University of Pennsylvania
"Intriguing, provocative, and readable. One comes away from this book with a good sense of why the institutions of corporate governance are not always what they seem, and why politics plays too large a role in the choice of what to embrace and what to shun. The existing literature on corporate governance is enriched by this book."--Donald C. Langevoort, Georgetown University
"This book is important, interesting, and argumentative. It is wonderfully useful for bringing us up to date with how theory applies to an important set of issues and what those issues say about theory. Corporate Governance will be valuable to many readers, from faculty to students, from journalists to directors, from those who like the system we have to those who are critical of it, and from those who agree with the author and those who don't!"--Peter A. Gourevitch, coauthor of Political Power and Corporate Control
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface vii INTRODUCTION: Corporate Governance as Promise 1 CHAPTER 1: The Goals of Corporate Governance: The Dominant Role of Equity 18 CHAPTER 2: Corporate Law and Corporate Governance 28 CHAPTER 3: Institutions and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance: A Taxonomy 46 CHAPTER 4: Boards of Directors 51 CHAPTER 5: Case Studies on Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance 69 CHAPTER 6: Dissident Directors 90 CHAPTER 7: Formal External Institutions of Corporate Governance: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchanges, and the Credit-Rating Agencies 105 CHAPTER 8: The Market for Corporate Control 118 CHAPTER 9: Initial Public Offerings and Private Placements 127 CHAPTER 10: Governance by Litigation: Derivative Lawsuits 130 CHAPTER 11: Accounting, Accounting Rules, and the Accounting Industry 155 CHAPTER 12: Quirky Governance: Insider Trading, Short Selling, and Whistle-blowing 165 CHAPTER 13: Shareholder Voting 199 CHAPTER 14: The Role of Banks and Other Lenders in Corporate Governance 223 CHAPTER 15: Hedge Funds and Private Equity 241 CONCLUSION 274 Notes 279 Index 325