The application of philosophy to language study, and language study to philosophy, has experienced demonstrable intellectual growth and diversification in recent decades. Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics comprehensively analyzes and evaluates many of the most interesting facets of this vibrant field.
An edited collection of articles taken from the award-winning Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition, this volume acts as a single-stop desk reference resource for the field, comprising contributions from the foremost scholars of philosophy of linguistics in their various interdisciplinary specializations.
From Plato's Cratylus to Semantic and Epistemic Holism, this fascinating work authoritatively unpacks the diverse and multi-layered concepts of meaning, expression, identity, truth, and countless other themes and subjects straddling the linguistic-philosophical meridian, in 175 articles and over 900 pages.
- Authoritative review of this dynamic field placed in an interdisciplinary context
- Approximately 175 articles by leaders in the field
- Compact and affordable single-volume format
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1;Front Cover;1 2;Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics;4 3;Copyright Page;5 4;The Editors;6 5;Alphabetical List of Articles;8 6;Subject Classification;14 7;Introduction;18 8;Contributors;20 9;A;24 9.1;A Priori Knowledge: Linguistic Aspects;24 9.1.1;Bibliography;26 9.2;Action Sentences and Adverbs;26 9.2.1;Action Sentences;26 9.2.2;Adverbs;27 9.2.3;Bibliography;28 9.3;Analytic Philosophy;29 9.3.1;Freges Analysis of Number Statements;29 9.3.2;Russells Theory of Descriptions;30 9.3.3;Moores Conception of Analysis;30 9.3.4;Wittgensteins Tractatus;30 9.3.5;Logical and Metaphysical Analysis;31 9.3.6;Ordinary Language Philosophy;31 9.3.7;Logical Positivism and the Quinean Tradition;31 9.3.8;Analytic Philosophy Today;32 9.3.9;Bibliography;32 9.4;Analytic/Synthetic, Necessary/Contingent, and a Priori/a Posteriori: Distinction;33 9.4.1;Necessary/Contingent Distinction;33 9.4.2;The a Priori/a Posteriori Distinction;34 9.4.3;Kripke on the Necessary a Posteriori and the Contingent a Priori;35 9.4.4;The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction;36 9.4.5;Metaphysical Analyticity;36 9.4.6;Quines Belief-Revisability Argument;37 9.4.7;Frege-Analyticity;37 9.4.8;Quines Objections to Frege-Analyticity of the Second Kind;38 9.4.9;Epistemological Analyticity;40 9.4.10;Bibliography;41 9.5;Anaphora: Philosophical Aspects;42 9.5.1;Bibliography;44 9.6;Architecture of Grammar;44 9.6.1;The Competence-Performance Divide;45 9.6.2;Grammars: Formal-Language Theory vs. Psychology;45 9.6.2.1;The Formal-Language Pattern;45 9.6.2.2;The Language Faculty as a Subpart of Central Cognitive Systems;46 9.6.2.3;Combining Formal Language and Psychological Traditions;46 9.6.3;Issues of Grammar Design;47 9.6.3.1;The Status of the Lexicon;47 9.6.3.2;The Syntax-Semantics Debate and the Grammar-Parser Relation;47 9.6.4;Summary;48 9.6.5;Bibliography;48 9.7;Aristotle and Linguistics;48 9.7.1;Bibliography;50 9.8;Assertion;51 9.8.1;Bibliography;53 10;B;54 10.1;Behaviorism: Varieties;54 10.1.1;Psychologi
cal Behaviorism;54 10.1.1.1;Rejection of Introspection as an Experimental Method;54 10.1.1.2;Shunning of Internal Events;54 10.1.1.3;Emphasis on Learning;55 10.1.2;Philosophical Behaviorism;56 10.1.2.1;Reductive Philosophical Behaviorism;56 10.1.2.2;Nonreductive Philosophical Behaviorism;57 10.1.2.3;Eliminative Philosophical Behaviorism;57 10.1.3;The Return of Psychological Behaviorism?;58 10.1.4;Bibliography;58 10.1.5;Further Reading;58 10.2;Boole and Algebraic Semantics;59 10.2.1;Bibliography;61 11;C;64 11.1;Causal Theories of Reference and Meaning;64 11.1.1;Reference, Meaning, and Causal Theories;64 11.1.2;The Causal-Historical Theory of Reference;64 11.1.3;The Causal Theory of Meaning;65 11.1.4;Problems and Prospects;66 11.1.5;Bibliography;66 11.2;Character versus Content;67 11.2.1;Content/Character Distinction and Semantics;67 11.2.2;Content/Character Distinction and Philosophy;68 11.2.3;Bibliography;69 11.3;Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Language;70 11.3.1;The Ideal Language Tradition;70 11.3.1.1;Example: Proper Names;70 11.3.1.2;Russells Theory of Descriptions;71 11.3.1.3;Limitations of the Ideal Language Approach;71 11.3.2;The Ordinary Language Tradition;72 11.3.2.1;Example: Ryle on Free Will;72 11.3.2.2;Limitations of the Ordinary Language Approach;73 11.3.3;The Cognitivist Tradition;74 11.3.3.1;Computational and Representational Theories of Mind;74 11.3.3.2;The Rejection of Linguistic Behaviorism;75 11.3.3.3;The Open Evidence Base;75 11.3.3.4;Meanings as Mental States;76 11.3.3.5;The Limitations of Cognitive Science;76 11.3.4;The New Philosophy of Language;76 11.3.4.1;Two More Theories of Proper Names;77 11.3.4.2;Empirical Evidence;77 11.3.4.3;Final Words;78 11.3.5;Bibliography;79 11.4;Communication: Semiotic Approaches;80 11.4.1;The Rise of a Controversy;80 11.4.2;Saussurean 'Signification' as Keyword and Sign of Contradiction;81 11.4.2.1;The Functionalist Reading;82 11.4.2.2;Some Code-model Approaches;85 11.4.3;Charles Sanders Peirce;85 11.4.4;Concl
usive Remarks;86 11.4.5;Bibliography;86 11.5;Communication, Understanding, and Interpretation: Philosophical Aspects;87 11.5.1;The Nature of Communication;87 11.5.2;Interpretation and Understanding;89 11.5.3;Bibliography;90 11.6;Comparatives: Semantics;91 11.6.1;Introduction;91 11.6.2;Gradability;92 11.6.3;Comparison;92 11.6.4;Comparison Cross-Linguistically;93 11.6.5;Bibliography;94 11.7;Compositionality: Philosophical Aspects;94 11.7.1;Considerations Against Semantic Compositionality;97 11.7.2;Formal Considerations;97 11.7.3;History;97 11.7.4;Bibliography;98 11.8;Compositionality: Semantic Aspects;98 11.8.1;Bibliography;100 11.9;Concepts;101 11.9.1;The Classical Theory;101 11.9.2;Probabilistic Theories;102 11.9.3;The Theory-Theory;102 11.9.4;Conceptual Atomism;103 11.9.5;Bibliography;103 11.10;Conditionals;104 11.10.1;Form and Meaning;104 11.10.2;Truth-Conditional Semantics;105 11.10.2.1;Material Conditional;105 11.10.2.2;(Variably) Strict Implication;105 11.10.2.3;Relative Likelihood;106 11.10.2.4;Probability;106 11.10.3;Summary;107 11.10.4;Bibliography;107 11.11;Context and Common Ground;108 11.11.1;History;108 11.11.2;Bases for Common Ground;108 11.11.2.1;Communal Common Ground;108 11.11.2.2;Personal Common Ground;109 11.11.3;Language and Communal Common Ground;109 11.11.4;Discourse and Personal Common Ground;110 11.11.5;Bibilography;110 11.12;Context Principle;111 11.12.1;Sentence Primacy: Three Interpretations of the Context Principle;111 11.12.2;Motivating the Context Principle;112 11.12.3;A Possible Objection to the Context Principle;114 11.12.4;Bibliography;116 11.13;Contextualism in Epistemology;117 11.13.1;Bibliography;119 11.14;Conventions in Language;119 11.14.1;Convention and Analyticity;119 11.14.2;Grice;120 11.14.3;Lewis;120 11.14.4;Lewiss General Notion of Convention;120 11.14.5;Conventions of Language;121 11.14.6;A Basic Difficulty for Grice-Lewis;121 11.14.7;Chomskyan Accounts of Linguistic Convention;122 11.14.8;Convention versus Inference;122 1
1.14.9;Bibliography;122 11.15;Cooperative Principle;123 11.15.1;The Principle Itself;123 11.15.2;What Counts as Cooperation?;123 11.15.3;The Cooperative Principle and the Maxims of Cooperative Discourse;123 11.15.4;Failures to Fulfill Maxims and Implicature;124 11.15.5;Major Critiques of the Cooperative Principle;125 11.15.5.1;Problems with the Term 'Cooperation';125 11.15.5.2;Problems with the Maxims: The Haphazardness of Communication and the Specificity of Maxims;126 11.15.6;Scholarship Influenced by the Cooperative Principle;126 11.15.6.1;Grammar;127 11.15.6.2;Neo-Gricean Pragmatics;127 11.15.6.3;Politeness Theory;127 11.15.6.4;Question Processing;128 11.15.6.5;Gender Studies;128 11.15.6.6;Teacher Research and Pedagogy;128 11.15.7;Conclusion;129 11.15.8;Bibliography;129 11.16;Coreference: Identity and Similarity;130 11.16.1;Defining Coreference;130 11.16.2;Identity;130 11.16.3;Similarity;130 11.16.3.1;Bound-Variable Anaphora;130 11.16.3.2;E-Type Anaphora;131 11.16.3.3;Anaphora of Laziness;131 11.16.3.4;Bridging Cross-reference Anaphora;131 11.16.4;Bibliography;132 11.17;Counterfactuals;132 11.17.1;Metalinguistic Approaches;133 11.17.2;Possible Worlds Approach;134 11.17.3;Some Issues;134 11.17.4;Bibliography;135 11.18;Creativity in Language;135 11.18.1;Coining Words;135 11.18.1.1;Children Coin Words, Too;136 11.18.2;Language Revival;136 11.18.3;Syntactic Units and Combinations;137 11.18.4;Extending Language in New Directions;137 11.18.5;Bibliography;138 12;D;140 12.1;Data and Evidence;140 12.1.1;Sources of Data;140 12.1.1.1;Corpora;140 12.1.1.2;Grammaticality Judgments;141 12.1.1.3;Fieldwork;142 12.1.1.4;Experiments;142 12.1.2;Kinds of Data;143 12.1.2.1;Language Acquisition and Creolization;143 12.1.2.2;Second Language;143 12.1.2.3;Bilingualism;143 12.1.2.4;Language Disorders;144 12.1.2.5;Performance Errors;144 12.1.2.6;Typology and Historical Change;144 12.1.3;General Remarks;144 12.1.3.1;Variability;144 12.1.3.2;Data, Evidence, and Theory;145 12.1.4;Bibliograph
y;146 12.2;De Dicto versus De Re;147 12.2.1;Bibliography;150 12.3;Default Semantics;151 12.3.1;Bibliography;154 12.4;Definite and Indefinite;154 12.4.1;What Does 'Definite' Mean?;154 12.4.1.1;Uniqueness?;154 12.4.1.2;Familiarity?;155 12.4.1.3;Some Puzzling Cases;156 12.4.2;Grammatical Phenomena;157 12.4.2.1;Existential Sentences;157 12.4.2.2;The Have Construction;157 12.4.3;Other Kinds of Definite and Indefinite NPs;157 12.4.3.1;Other Kinds of Definite NPs;157 12.4.3.2;Bare NPs;158 12.4.3.3;Other Types of Indefinite NPs;158 12.4.4;Other Kinds of Categorizations;159 12.4.4.1;Old and New;159 12.4.4.2;The Givenness Hierarchy;159 12.4.4.3;The Accessibility Hierarchy;159 12.4.5;Definite and Indefinite in Other Languages;159 12.4.6;Bibliography;160 12.5;Definitions: Uses and Varieties of;161 12.5.1;Uses;161 12.5.2;Varieties;162 12.5.2.1;Comparatively Context-Free Forms of Definition;162 12.5.2.1.1;Comparatively Context-Dependent Definitions;163 12.5.3;Uses Again;163 12.5.4;Bibliography;164 12.6;Deflationism;164 12.6.1;Bibliography;166 12.7;Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches;167 12.7.1;Bibliography;169 12.8;Description and Prescription;169 12.8.1;Bibliography;174 12.8.2;Relevant Website;174 12.9;Descriptions, Definite and Indefinite: Philosophical Aspects;174 12.9.1;Russells Theories of Description;175 12.9.1.1;Russells Early Theory of Denoting;175 12.9.1.2;Russells Mature Theory;175 12.9.1.3;Definite Descriptions in Principia mathematica;175 12.9.1.4;Descriptions and Scope;176 12.9.2;Responses to Russells Theory of Definite Descriptions;176 12.9.2.1;Strawsons Critique of Russell;176 12.9.2.2;The Ambiguity Thesis;177 12.9.3;Responses to Russells Theory of Indefinite Descriptions;178 12.9.3.1;Referential Uses of Indefinite Descriptions;178 12.9.3.2;An Alternative Nonreferential Account;178 12.9.4;Bibliography;179 12.10;Direct Reference;180 12.10.1;What Is Direct Reference?;180 12.10.2;Some Closely Related Concepts;181 12.10.3;Problems with Direct Reference;182 12.10.
4;Bibliography;183 12.11;Discourse Representation Theory;183 12.11.1;The Problem of Unbound Anaphora;183 12.11.2;Basic Ideas;184 12.11.3;Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs);186 12.11.4;Extensions: Tense and Plurals;187 12.11.5;Incorporating Generalized Quantifiers;187 12.11.6;Discourse Structures and Partial Models;188 12.11.7;Reasoning with DRSs;189 12.11.7.1;Definition 1 (DRT);189 12.11.7.2;Definition 2 (Semantics of DRT);189 12.11.7.3;Definition 3 (DRT Consequence);189 12.11.7.4;Theorem 4;190 12.11.7.4.1;Proof;190 12.11.7.5;Theorem 5;190 12.11.8;The Treatment of Ambiguities;191 12.11.9;Bibliography;191 12.12;Donkey Sentences;192 12.12.1;Bibliography;194 12.13;Dthat;194 12.13.1;Bibliography;195 12.14;Dynamic Semantics;195 12.14.1;Information and Information Change;195 12.14.2;Discourse Representation Theory and File Change Semantics;196 12.14.3;Dynamic Predicate Logic;197 12.14.4;Update Semantics;198 12.14.5;Presuppositions;199 12.14.6;Further Reading;199 12.14.7;Bibliography;199 13;E;202 13.1;E-Language versus I-Language;202 13.1.1;E-Language/I-Language Distinction;202 13.1.2;Some Preliminary Characterizations;202 13.1.3;Getting at Whats Fundamental;203 13.1.4;Individualism and Antiindividualism;204 13.1.5;Semantic Intuitions in Linguistics and General Epistemology;204 13.1.6;Bibliography;205 13.2;Empiricism;206 13.2.1;Species of Empiricism;206 13.2.2;Empiricism and Language;207 13.2.3;Bibliography;208 13.3;Empty Names;208 13.3.1;The Problem of Negative Existentials;209 13.3.2;Millianism;209 13.3.3;Fregeanism;210 13.3.4;More Millianism: The Gappy Proposition View;210 13.3.5;Still More Millianism: The Communicated Proposition View;211 13.3.6;Bibliography;211 13.4;Epistemology and Language;212 13.4.1;Bibliography;214 13.5;Essential Indexical;214 13.5.1;Bibliography;215 13.6;Event-Based Semantics;215 13.6.1;Bibliography;218 13.7;Evolution of Semantics;219 13.7.1;Cognitive Preadaptations for Semantic Knowledge;219 13.7.1.1;The Importance of Motor Evolution;220
13.7.1.2;The Importance of Intention-Reading Skills;220 13.7.1.3;The Importance of Personality Types;221 13.7.2;The Nature and Evolution of Semantic Knowledge;222 13.7.2.1;Concept Formation;222 13.7.2.2;The Nature of Lexical Concepts: The Natural Partitions Hypothesis;223 13.7.2.3;Lexical Concepts and Concept-Combination;224 13.7.2.4;Polysemy;225 13.7.2.5;Abstract Concepts;225 13.7.2.6;Cultural Evolution;226 13.7.3;Bibliography;226 13.8;Evolution of Syntax;227 13.8.1;Language;227 13.8.2;Evolution of Language;228 13.8.3;Syntax;229 13.8.4;Evolution of Syntax;229 13.8.5;Is Syntax Adaptive?;230 13.8.6;Exaptation;230 13.8.7;Biological or Nonbiological Evolution;230 13.8.8;The 'Big Picture' and Details of Syntax;230 13.8.9;Effects of Particular Developments Within Theories of Syntax;231 13.8.10;When Did Syntax Emerge?;231 13.8.11;How Many Stages?;231 13.8.12;A Series of Stages;231 13.8.13;Conclusion;233 13.8.14;Bibliography;233 13.9;Existence;234 13.9.1;What Existence Is;234 13.9.2;The Hume-Kant View;235 13.9.3;The Frege-Russell View;235 13.9.4;The Meinong-Russell View;236 13.9.5;Bibliography;237 13.10;Expression Meaning versus Utterance/Speaker Meaning;237 13.10.1;Bibliography;239 13.11;Expressive Power of Language;240 13.11.1;Bibliography;242 13.12;Extensionality and Intensionality;242 13.12.1;Semantical Aspects of Extensionality and Intensionality;243 13.12.2;Extensionality and Intensionality in Formal Settings;244 13.12.3;Bibliography;245 13.13;Externalism about Content;245 13.13.1;The Thesis of Externalism;245 13.13.2;Arguments for and against Externalism;245 13.13.2.1;Natural Kind Terms;245 13.13.2.2;Indexicals;246 13.13.2.3;Burge and Linguistic Practice;246 13.13.2.4;Accounts of Content;247 13.13.3;Externalisms Consequences;247 13.13.4;Bibliography;247 14;F;250 14.1;Fictional Discourse: Philosophical Aspects;250 14.1.1;The Nature of Fictional Discourse;250 14.1.2;Truth in a Fiction;250 14.1.3;Semantics of Fictional Discourse;251 14.1.4;Responding to Fictions;252 1
4.1.5;Bibliography;252 14.2;Figurative Language: Semiotics;253 14.2.1;Introduction;253 14.2.2;Theories of Metaphor;254 14.2.3;Selected Review of Theories of Metaphor;254 14.2.3.1;Aristotle (384-322 b.c.);254 14.2.3.2;Giambattista Vico (1668-1744);255 14.2.3.3;I. A. Richards (1893-1979);256 14.2.3.4;Max Black (1909-1988);257 14.2.3.5;Groupe ;257 14.2.3.6;Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005);258 14.2.3.7;George Lakoff (b. 1941) and Mark Johnson (b. 1949);258 14.2.3.7.1;Conceptual Metaphor;258 14.2.3.7.2;Metonymy;259 14.2.3.7.3;Synecdoche;259 14.2.3.7.4;The Image-Schema;259 14.2.3.8;Ronald W. Langacker (b. 1942);260 14.2.4;Literal Versus Figurative Language;260 14.2.5;Semiosis and the Signifying Order;261 14.2.6;The Uses of Metaphor;262 14.2.6.1;Theory-Constitutive Metaphors;263 14.2.6.1.1;Linguistics;263 14.2.6.1.2;Physics;264 14.2.6.1.3;Anatomy;264 14.2.6.1.4;Second Language Pedagogy;264 14.2.7;Concluding Remarks;264 14.2.8;Bibliography;265 14.3;Formal Semantics;266 14.3.1;Introduction;266 14.3.1.1;Semantics vs. Lexicography;266 14.3.1.2;The Notion of Synonymy and Its Problems;267 14.3.2;Truth and Semantic Competence;269 14.3.3;Semantic Modeling;272 14.3.4;The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface;277 14.3.5;Conclusions;280 14.3.6;Bibliography;281 14.4;Formalism/Formalist Linguistics;281 14.4.1;General Characterization;281 14.4.2;The Research Program of Chomskyan Linguistics;282 14.4.3;Other Mentalist Approaches;284 14.4.4;Purely Formalist Approaches;285 14.4.5;Aspects of Language Use;286 14.4.6;References;287 14.5;Frame Problem;288 14.5.1;Origins of the Problem;288 14.5.2;Frame Axioms Result in Computational Overload;288 14.5.3;The Sleeping Dog Strategy and Nonmonotonic Logics;289 14.5.4;The Yale Shooting Problem;289 14.5.5;Holism Presents a Problem for the Sleeping Dog Strategy;289 14.5.6;Concluding Remarks;290 14.5.7;Bibliography;290 14.6;Functionalist Theories of Language;291 14.6.1;Functionalism within the Gamut of Linguistic Theories;291 14.6.2;The Basic Tenets of Functionalism;2
91 14.6.3;Further Features;292 14.6.3.1;Inclusive Rather Than Core Grammars;292 14.6.3.2;The Use of Authentic Textual Data;292 14.6.3.3;Flexibility of Meaning and Structure;293 14.6.3.4;A Discourse Grammar, Not Just a Sentence Grammar;293 14.6.3.5;Typological Orientation;293 14.6.3.6;A Constructivist Account of Acquisition;293 14.6.4;Important Functional Theories;293 14.6.4.1;Functional Grammar;293 14.6.4.2;Role and Reference Grammar;294 14.6.4.3;Systemic Functional Grammar;295 14.6.4.4;West Coast Functionalism;296 14.6.4.5;Usage-Based Functionalist-Cognitive Models;297 14.6.5;Conclusions;297 14.6.6;Bibliography;298 14.7;Future Tense and Future Time Reference;299 14.7.1;Bibliography;300 15;G;302 15.1;Game-Theoretical Semantics;302 15.1.1;Bibliography;304 15.2;Generative Grammar;305 15.2.1;Bibliography;307 15.3;Generative Semantics;307 15.3.1;Foreword (by Randy Harris);307 15.3.2;Generative Semantics (by James D McCawley);307 15.3.3;GS Positions on Controversial Issues;308 15.3.4;GS Policies on the Conduct of Research;309 15.3.5;Prominent and Influential Analyses Proposed within the GS Approach;310 15.3.6;The History of GS;310 15.3.7;Bibliography;311 15.4;Generic Reference;312 15.4.1;Forms of Generic Reference;312 15.4.2;Theory of Generic Reference;314 15.4.3;Bibliography;315 15.5;Grammatical Meaning;316 15.5.1;Bibliography;317 16;H;318 16.1;Holism, Semantic and Epistemic;318 16.1.1;Epistemic Holism;318 16.1.2;Semantic Holism;318 16.1.2.1;The Argument from Compositionality and the Context Principle;318 16.1.2.2;Problems with Semantic Holism;319 16.1.2.2.1;Learning Problem;319 16.1.2.2.2;Instability Problem;320 16.1.2.2.3;Disagreement Problem;320 16.1.2.3;Semantic Holism and the Philosophy of Mind;320 16.1.3;Conclusion;320 16.1.4;Bibliography;320 17;I;322 17.1;Ideational Theories of Meaning;322 17.1.1;Bibliography;324 17.2;Identity and Sameness: Philosophical Aspects;325 17.2.1;Introduction;325 17.2.2;The Logic of Identity;325 17.2.3;Relative and Absolute Identity;325
17.2.4;Criteria of Identity;326 17.2.5;Identity over Time;326 17.2.6;Contingent Identity;327 17.2.7;Vague Identity;327 17.2.8;Bibliography;327 17.3;Immunity to Error through Misidentification;328 17.3.1;IEM;328 17.3.2;IEM 'I'-Utterances;328 17.3.3;Bibliography;331 17.4;Implicature;331 17.4.1;The Basic Notions;331 17.4.2;Beyond Grice;333 17.4.2.1;Presumptive Meanings: Levinsons Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature;333 17.4.2.2;Division of Pragmatic Labor: Horns Q- and R-Principles;337 17.4.2.3;Relevance Theory: Carstons Underdeterminacy Thesis;338 17.4.3;Quality Reconsidered;340 17.4.4;Implicature and the Grammar/Pragmatics Interface;341 17.4.5;Conclusions;342 17.4.6;Bibliography;343 17.5;Indeterminacy, Semantic;345 17.5.1;The Argument from Below;345 17.5.2;Reactions to the Argument from Below;346 17.5.3;The Argument from Above;346 17.5.4;Reactions to the Argument from Above;346 17.5.5;Bibliography;347 17.6;Indexicality: Philosophical Aspects;347 17.6.1;Bibliography;350 17.7;Innate Ideas;350 17.7.1;What Is Innateness?;351 17.7.2;Which Concepts are Innate?;351 17.7.3;Bibliography;353 17.8;Innate Knowledge;353 17.8.1;Bibliography;356 17.9;Intention and Semantics;356 17.9.1;Bibliography;359 17.10;Interpreted Logical Forms;359 17.10.1;Propositional Attitude Reports;359 17.10.2;What Are ILFs?;360 17.10.3;Puzzles and Problems;360 17.10.3.1;The Simple Name Puzzle;360 17.10.3.2;The Simple Demonstrative Puzzle;360 17.10.3.3;The Hard Demonstrative Puzzle;361 17.10.3.4;The Hard Name Puzzle;361 17.10.4;Prospects;362 17.10.5;Bibliography;363 17.11;Irony;364 17.11.1;Bibliography;365 18;L;368 18.1;Language as an Object of Study;368 18.1.1;Language as a Social Fact;368 18.1.2;Language as Behavior;369 18.1.3;Language as a Mental Organ;369 18.1.4;Language as an Abstract Object;370 18.1.5;Bibliography;371 18.2;Lexical Conceptual Structure;372 18.2.1;Introduction;372 18.2.2;Overview of Conceptual Semantics;373 18.2.2.1;Autonomy of Semantics;373 18.2.2.2;Lexical Conceptual S
tructure;374 18.2.2.2.1;Ontological Categories;375 18.2.2.2.2;Conceptual Formation Rules;375 18.2.2.3;X-bar Semantics;376 18.2.3;General Constraints on Semantic Theories;377 18.2.4;Comparison with Other Works;378 18.2.5;Suggested Readings;379 18.2.6;Bibliography;379 18.3;Lexical Semantics: Overview;380 18.3.1;Word Knowledge;380 18.3.2;Historical Overview;380 18.3.3;Ambiguity and Polysemy;381 18.3.4;Lexical Relations;382 18.3.5;The Semantics of a Lexical Entry;382 18.3.5.1;Lexical Semantic Classifications;383 18.3.5.2;Argument Structure;383 18.3.5.3;Event Structure and Lexical Decomposition;384 18.3.5.4;Qualia Structure;385 18.3.6;Bibliography;386 18.4;Limits of Language;388 18.4.1;Bibliography;390 18.5;Linguistic Reality;391 18.5.1;Why Those Objects?;391 18.5.2;What Are They?;391 18.5.3;Types and Tokens;391 18.5.4;What Are Word Types?;392 18.5.5;Realism;392 18.5.6;Conceptualism;393 18.5.7;Nominalism;393 18.5.8;Bibliography;394 18.6;Linguistics as a Science;394 18.6.1;What Is a Science?;394 18.6.2;The Scientific Study of Language;396 18.6.3;Bibliography;400 18.7;Linguistics: Approaches;401 18.7.1;Introduction;401 18.7.2;The Status of Linguistic Form;401 18.7.3;Rationalist and Empiricist Approaches and the Status of Data;402 18.7.4;The Production of Form;404 18.7.5;The 'Landscape' of Language and its Division into Fields of Linguistic Inquiry;405 18.7.6;Bibliography;406 18.8;Linguistics: Discipline of;406 18.8.1;Introduction;406 18.8.2;The Meaning of 'Language';406 18.8.3;Knowledge of Language;407 18.8.4;Describing Knowledge of Language;411 18.8.5;Explanation in Language;413 18.8.6;Linguistics as a 'Science';416 18.8.7;Beyond Language: Pragmatics and the Language of Thought;419 18.8.8;Bibliography;420 18.9;Logic and Language: Philosophical Aspects;421 18.9.1;Introduction;421 18.9.2;The Mathematicization of Logic: Leibniz and Boole;421 18.9.3;Logic and Language in Frege;423 18.9.4;Russell: Definite Descriptions and Logical Atomism;424 18.9.5;Wittgenstein on Logic and L
anguage;426 18.9.6;Carnap and the Vienna Circle;427 18.9.7;Quine: the Thesis of Gradualism;428 18.9.8;Bibliography;429 18.10;Logical Consequence;430 18.10.1;Fundamentals;430 18.10.2;The Formal Study of Logical Consequence;430 18.10.3;General Philosophical Concerns;432 18.10.4;Bibliography;433 18.11;Logical Form in Linguistics;433 18.11.1;Bibliography;436 18.12;Lying, Honesty, and Promising;436 18.12.1;Informational Theories;436 18.12.2;Noninformational Theories;437 18.12.3;Bibliography;438 19;M;440 19.1;Mass Nouns, Count Nouns, and Non-count Nouns: Philosophical Aspects;440 19.1.1;Plural Count Nouns and Non-count Nouns;440 19.1.2;The Concept 'Mass Noun' and Its Supposed Criterion;440 19.1.3;An Illusory Criterion;441 19.1.4;The Non-metaphysical Goods;442 19.1.5;Bibliography;443 19.2;Maxims and Flouting;444 19.2.1;The Cooperative Principle;444 19.2.1.1;The Maxims;444 19.2.1.1.1;Quantity;444 19.2.1.1.2;Quality;444 19.2.1.1.3;Relation;444 19.2.1.1.4;Manner;444 19.2.2;What Is a Maxim?;445 19.2.3;Flouting: Past, Present, and Future;446 19.2.4;Conclusion;446 19.2.5;Bibliography;446 19.3;Meaning: Cognitive Dependency of Lexical Meaning;447 19.3.1;Bibliography;449 19.4;Meaning: Development;449 19.4.1;Conventionality and Contrast;450 19.4.2;In Conversation;450 19.4.3;Making Inferences;451 19.4.4;Pragmatics and Meaning;452 19.4.5;Another Approach;453 19.4.6;Sources of Meanings;454 19.4.7;Summary;454 19.4.8;Bibliography;455 19.5;Meaning: Overview of Philosophical Theories;456 19.5.1;The Direct Reference Theory;456 19.5.2;Meaning as Truth Conditions;457 19.5.3;Sense and Reference;458 19.5.4;The Idea Theory;459 19.5.5;Meaning as Use;459 19.5.6;Quines Skepticism;460 19.5.7;Bibliography;461 19.6;Meaning: Procedural and Conceptual;461 19.6.1;Relevance Theoretic Semantics;462 19.6.2;Why Languages Develop Procedural Encoding;462 19.6.3;The Conceptual-Procedural Distinction and Conventional Implicature;463 19.6.4;Procedural Analyses of Discourse Markers;464 19.6.5;Future Directions;464
19.6.6;Bibliography;464 19.7;Mentalese;465 19.7.1;The Basic Hypothesis;465 19.7.2;What Is Mentalese Like?;465 19.7.2.1;The Thinkers Public Language, or a Proprietary Inner Code?;465 19.7.2.2;Psycho-Syntax and Psycho-Semantics;466 19.7.3;Further Arguments for LOT;466 19.7.3.1;Theories of Mental Processing Are Committed to LOT;466 19.7.3.2;LOT Explains Some Pervasive Features of Thought;467 19.7.4;Bibliography;467 19.8;Metalanguage versus Object Language;467 19.8.1;Bibliography;468 19.9;Metaphor: Philosophical Theories;468 19.9.1;Metaphor and Philosophy;468 19.9.1.1;Defining Metaphor;468 19.9.1.2;Delineating Metaphor;469 19.9.2;The Metaphorical and the Literal;469 19.9.2.1;Deviance and Value;469 19.9.2.2;Deviance: Semantic or Pragmatic?;469 19.9.3;Theories of Metaphor;470 19.9.3.1;Conditions of Adequacy;470 19.9.3.2;Aristotle;470 19.9.3.3;Interaction Theories of Metaphor;471 19.9.3.4;Davidson and Metaphorical Meaning;471 19.9.4;Bibliography;471 19.10;Metaphor: Psychological Aspects;472 19.10.1;The Ubiquity of Metaphor in Language;472 19.10.2;Metaphor Understanding: The Standard View;473 19.10.3;Psychological Tests of the Standard View;473 19.10.4;Psychological Models of Metaphor Understanding;475 19.10.5;Metaphor in Thought;476 19.10.6;Psychological Studies on Conceptual Metaphor;477 19.10.7;Bibliography;478 19.11;Metaphysics, Substitution Salva Veritate and the Slingshot Argument;479 19.11.1;Metaphysics and Language: Facts, Propositions and 'MCT Operators';479 19.11.2;Substitution Salva Veritate;480 19.11.3;The Argument: The Slingshot Itself;483 19.11.4;Aiming the Slingshot at Facts, and Factlike Things;485 19.11.5;Responses to the Slingshot Argument;486 19.11.6;Bibliography;488 19.12;Modal Logic;488 19.12.1;Bibliography;494 19.13;Modern Linguistics: 1800 to the Present Day;495 19.13.1;Introduction;495 19.13.2;Comparative Philology;496 19.13.3;The Neogrammarians;496 19.13.4;Saussurean Structuralism;497 19.13.5;Linguistic Geography;498 19.13.6;Linguistic Anthropology
;498 19.13.7;Linguistic Relativity;499 19.13.8;Behaviorism;499 19.13.9;Distributionalism;500 19.13.10;Generativism;500 19.13.11;Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics;501 19.13.12;Speech-Act Theory;501 19.13.13;Language Origins and Nonhuman Language;501 19.13.14;Retrospect;502 19.13.15;Bibliography;502 19.14;Modularity;503 19.14.1;Bibliography;504 19.15;Monotonicity and Generalized Quantifiers;505 19.15.1;Bibliography;508 19.16;Montague Semantics;508 19.16.1;Historical Background;508 19.16.2;Aims;509 19.16.3;The Compositional Approach;510 19.16.3.1;Interpretation in a Model;512 19.16.3.2;Extension and Intension;512 19.16.3.3;A Small Fragment;513 19.16.3.4;Some PTQ Phenomena;515 19.16.3.5;Developments;517 19.16.3.6;Further Reading;518 19.16.4;Bibliography;518 19.17;Mood, Clause Types, and Illocutionary Force;519 19.17.1;Bibliography;523 20;N;524 20.1;Natural Kind Terms;524 20.1.1;What Are Natural Kind Terms?;524 20.1.2;The Semantics of Natural Kind Terms: Descriptivism;525 20.1.3;Against Descriptivism;525 20.1.4;Causal Theories;526 20.1.5;Descriptivism Redux;526 20.1.6;Hybrid Views;527 20.1.7;Bibliography;527 20.2;Natural versus Nonnatural Meaning;528 20.2.1;Grices Distinction;528 20.2.2;Grices Theory of Non-natural Meaning;529 20.2.3;Other Remarks;529 20.2.4;Bibliography;529 20.3;Naturalism;530 20.3.1;Bibliography;532 20.4;Negation: Philosophical Aspects;533 20.4.1;Possible Properties of Negation;533 20.4.2;Negations, Consistency, and Paradoxes;534 20.4.3;More Than One Negation?;535 20.4.4;Negation and Denial;535 20.4.5;Bibliography;536 20.5;Negation: Semantic Aspects;536 20.5.1;Classical and Nonclassical Negation;536 20.5.2;Negation and Polarity;538 20.5.3;Negation Versus Denial;539 20.5.4;Metalinguistic Negation;540 20.5.5;Bibliography;542 20.6;Nominalism;543 20.6.1;Extreme Realism: Platos Ideal Exemplars;543 20.6.2;Moderate Realism or Conceptualism: Aristotles Universals;543 20.6.3;The Moderate Realism/Conceptualism of Medieval Aristotelians;544 20.6.4;Abstraction, Indu
ction, and Essentialism;544 20.6.5;The Ontological Commitments of Moderate Realism;544 20.6.6;Late Medieval and Modern Nominalism;545 20.6.7;Nominalism, Antirealism, and Skepticism;546 20.6.8;Bibliography;546 20.7;Nonmonotonic Inference;547 20.7.1;Bibliography;549 20.8;Nonstandard Language Use;550 20.8.1;Bibliography;553 20.9;Normativity;553 20.9.1;Prescriptive Versus Descriptive Linguistics;554 20.9.2;Semantics and Normativity;554 20.9.3;Pragmatics and Normativity;555 20.9.4;Linguistic Properties of Normative Terms;555 20.9.5;Bibliography;556 21;O;558 21.1;Object-Dependent Thoughts;558 21.1.1;Singular Thoughts as Object Dependent;558 21.1.2;Epistemological Consequences of Object-Dependence;558 21.1.3;The Central Motivation for Object Dependence;559 21.1.4;Criticisms and Rivals;560 21.1.5;Bibliography;561 21.2;Objectivity in Moral Discourse;562 21.2.1;Ontological Objectivity;563 21.2.2;Ontological Objectivity and Moral Discourse;563 21.2.2.1;Grammatical and Semantic Markers;563 21.2.2.2;Ontological Markers;563 21.2.2.3;Epistemological Marker;564 21.2.3;Moral Realism;564 21.2.4;Denying Ontological Objectivity in Moral Discourse;565 21.2.5;Methodological Objectivism;566 21.2.6;Conclusion;567 21.2.7;Bibliography;567 21.3;Objects, Properties, and Functions;568 21.3.1;Bibliography;570 21.4;Ordinary Language Philosophy;571 21.4.1;Language and Philosophy;571 21.4.2;Ordinary Language Philosophy;571 21.4.3;The Oxford Version: Austin;571 21.4.4;Some Questions about Austins Approach;572 21.4.5;The Cambridge Version: Wittgenstein;572 21.4.6;Some Questions About Wittgensteins Approach;573 21.4.7;Conclusion;574 21.4.8;Bibliography;574 21.5;Origin of Language Debate;574 21.5.1;Preliminaries;574 21.5.2;Discussions on the Origin of Language in Classical Antiquity;575 21.5.3;Discussions on the Origin of Language in the Enlightenment;575 21.5.4;The Origin of Language Topic in the 19th and 20th Centuries;578 21.5.5;Bibliography;578 22;P;580 22.1;Paradoxes, Semantic;580 22.1.1;The Parad
oxes;580 22.1.2;Suggested Solutions to the Liar;581 22.1.3;Bibliography;582 22.2;Philosophy of Linguistics;583 22.2.1;Bibliography;588 22.3;Philosophy of Science and Linguistics;589 22.3.1;Bibliography;591 22.4;Plato and His Predecessors;592 22.4.1;Predecessors;592 22.4.2;Plato;593 22.4.3;Bibliography;594 22.5;Plato's Cratylus and Its Legacy;594 22.5.1;Bibliography;597 22.6;Plurality;597 22.6.1;Bibliography;599 22.7;Polysemy and Homonymy;600 22.7.1;Evidence Used in Differentiating Homonyms and Polysemes;601 22.7.2;Theoretical Approaches to Polysemy and Homonymy;601 22.7.3;Bibliography;602 22.8;Possible Worlds: Philosophical Theories;603 22.8.1;Bibliography;605 22.9;Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said;605 22.9.1;Bibliography;608 22.10;Predication;608 22.10.1;Bibliography;611 22.11;Presupposition;612 22.11.1;Introduction;612 22.11.2;Operational Criteria;612 22.11.3;The Logical Problem;614 22.11.3.1;The Threat to Bivalence;614 22.11.3.2;The Russell Tradition;614 22.11.3.3;The Frege-Strawson Tradition;615 22.11.3.4;The Trivalent Solution;616 22.11.4;The Discourse Approach;616 22.11.5;The Structural Source of Presuppositions;618 22.11.6;Bibliography;618 22.12;Principles and Parameters Framework of Generative Grammar;619 22.12.1;Mechanisms for Phrase Structure Representations;620 22.12.2;Constraints on Derivations and Representations;621 22.12.2.1;Full Interpretation;622 22.12.2.2;Locality of Movement;623 22.12.2.3;Binding Theory;625 22.12.2.3.1;Bound Anaphors;625 22.12.2.3.2;Pronouns;626 22.12.3;Conclusion;626 22.12.4;Bibliography;627 22.13;Private Language Argument;628 22.13.1;The Arguments Target;628 22.13.2;Supplementary Strands;629 22.13.3;Rules and Communities;629 22.13.4;Radical Evidence-Independence and the 'Theory Response';630 22.13.5;Bibliography;631 22.14;Proper Names: Philosophical Aspects;632 22.14.1;What Are Proper Names?;632 22.14.2;Two Central Issues: Meaning and Reference;632 22.14.3;Theories of Meaning;632 22.14.3.1;Millian Theories;632 22.14.3.2;Des
cription Theories;632 22.14.4;Theories of Reference;633 22.14.4.1;Description Theories;633 22.14.4.2;Causal Theories;634 22.14.4.3;Hybrid Theories;635 22.14.5;Other Expressions;635 22.14.5.1;Definite Descriptions;635 22.14.5.2;Natural Kind Terms;635 22.14.6;Bibliography;635 22.15;Propositional Attitude Ascription: Philosophical Aspects;636 22.15.1;Bibliography;639 22.16;Propositions;640 22.16.1;Roles Played by Propositions;640 22.16.2;Propositions as Abstract Entities;641 22.16.3;Two Approaches: Structured and Structureless Entities;641 22.16.4;Two Structured Approaches: Russellian and Fregean;642 22.16.5;Ontology or Semantics?;642 22.16.6;A Problem for the Structureless Approach;642 22.16.7;Problems for the Structured Approaches;643 22.16.8;Bibliography;644 23;Q;646 23.1;Quantifiers: Semantics;646 23.1.1;Standard Quantifiers: Some Linguistic Generalizations;646 23.1.2;Some Non-Standard Quantifiers;649 23.1.3;Bibliography;651 24;R;654 24.1;Radical Interpretation, Translation and Interpretationalism;654 24.1.1;Radical Translation;654 24.1.2;Radical Interpretation;654 24.1.3;Interpretationalism;656 24.1.4;Criticisms of Radical Interpretation and Interpretationalism;656 24.1.5;Bibliography;657 24.2;Realism and Antirealism;657 24.2.1;Bibliography;660 24.3;Reference: Philosophical Theories;660 24.3.1;What Is Reference?;660 24.3.2;Descriptivism;661 24.3.2.1;Descriptivist Theories of Reference;661 24.3.2.2;Freges and Russells Versions of Descriptivism;661 24.3.2.3;Differences Between Descriptivist Views;662 24.3.3;Antidescriptivism and the Causal-Historical Theory of Reference;663 24.3.3.1;Problems With Descriptivism;663 24.3.3.2;The Causal-Historical Theory of Reference;664 24.3.3.3;Problems With the Causal-Historical Theory;664 24.3.4;Skepticism, Naturalism, and Minimalism About Reference;665 24.3.5;Summary;666 24.3.6;Bibliography;667 24.4;Referential versus Attributive;667 24.4.1;Donnellans Contrast;667 24.4.2;Donnellans Use of the Contrast against Russell;668 24.4.3;Pr
agmatic Treatments (Kripke);669 24.4.4;Semantic Treatments (Wettstein);670 24.4.5;Developments;670 24.4.6;Bibliography;671 24.5;Relevance Theory;671 24.5.1;Basic Claims;672 24.5.1.1;Code versus Inference;672 24.5.1.2;A Post-Gricean Theory;672 24.5.1.3;Two Principles of Relevance;673 24.5.1.4;Assessing Relevance: Cognitive Effects versus Processing Effort;673 24.5.2;Current Issues and Open Debates;674 24.5.2.1;The Explicit/Implicit Distinction;674 24.5.2.2;Conceptual and Procedural Encoding;674 24.5.2.3;Ad hoc Concept Formation;675 24.5.2.4;Mutual Knowledge versus Mutual Manifestness;675 24.5.2.5;Communicated and Noncommunicated Acts;675 24.5.2.6;Irony and the Notion of Echo;675 24.5.2.7;Modularity;676 24.5.2.8;Relevance Theory as Asocial;676 24.5.3;Empirical Evidence;676 24.5.4;Applications;677 24.5.5;Concluding Remarks;678 24.5.6;Bibliography;678 24.6;Representation in Language and Mind;679 24.6.1;The Relationship between Language and Thought;679 24.6.2;Mental Representation as Basic;679 24.6.2.1;Information-Based Theories;679 24.6.2.2;Teleological Theories;680 24.6.2.3;Conceptual Role Theories;680 24.6.2.4;Constraints on a Theory of Mental Representation;680 24.6.3;Linguistic Representation as Basic;681 24.6.3.1;Norms-Based Theories;681 24.6.4;A Non-Reductive Proposal;681 24.6.5;Bibliography;681 24.7;Rigid Designation;682 24.7.1;Introduction;682 24.7.2;Names and Rigidity;682 24.7.3;Types of Rigidity;683 24.7.4;Bibliography;683 24.8;Rules and Rule-Following;684 24.8.1;Rule-Following and Meaning;684 24.8.2;Constitutive and Epistemological Skepticism;684 24.8.3;KWs Skeptical Argument;684 24.8.4;KWs Skeptical Solution;685 24.8.5;Significance of the Issue;686 24.8.6;Responses to the Skeptical Paradox and Skeptical Solution;686 24.8.7;Bibliography;686 25;S;688 25.1;Saussure: Theory of the Sign;688 25.1.1;Bibliography;699 25.2;Scope and Binding: Semantic Aspects;700 25.2.1;Bibliography;702 25.3;Semantic Value;703 25.3.1;Bibliography;707 25.4;Semantics of Interrogatives;7
08 25.4.1;Metasemantics;708 25.4.2;Semantics;709 25.4.3;Bibliography;710 25.5;Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary;711 25.5.1;The Philosophical Debate;711 25.5.2;The Mentalist Picture of the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary;716 25.5.3;Bibliography;718 25.6;Sense and Reference: Philosophical Aspects;719 25.6.1;The Origins and Central Core of the Sense/Reference Distinction;719 25.6.2;More on Freges Distinction;720 25.6.3;Subsequent History, and Criticisms;720 25.6.4;Bibliography;721 25.7;Situation Semantics;722 25.7.1;Guide to Literature;723 25.7.2;Bibliography;724 25.8;Social Construction and Language;725 25.8.1;Nonanalytic Approaches;725 25.8.2;Analytic Approaches;725 25.8.2.1;Early Analytic Approaches and Social Construction;725 25.8.2.2;John Searles Approach;726 25.8.2.2.1;Social Construction;726 25.8.2.2.2;The Role of Language;727 25.8.3;Critical Assessment;727 25.8.4;Bibliography;728 25.9;Speech Acts;728 25.9.1;J. L. Austin;728 25.9.1.1;The Performative/Constative Dichotomy;728 25.9.1.2;Austins Felicity Conditions on Performatives;729 25.9.1.3;Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Speech Acts;730 25.9.2;J. R. Searle;731 25.9.2.1;Searles Felicity Conditions on Speech Acts;731 25.9.2.2;Searles Typology of Speech Acts;732 25.9.3;Indirect Speech Acts;732 25.9.4;Speech Acts and Culture;734 25.9.4.1;Cross-Cultural Variation;734 25.9.4.2;Interlanguage Variation;736 25.9.5;Bibliography;736 25.10;Syncategoremata;737 25.10.1;The History of the Distinction;737 25.10.2;Syntactic and Semantic Criteria of Drawing the Distinction;738 25.10.3;Philosophical Significance of the Distinction;739 25.10.4;Bibliography;740 25.11;Syntax-Semantics Interface;741 25.11.1;The Model of Perfection: Artificial Languages;741 25.11.2;Where Natural Languages Seem Imperfect;742 25.11.3;Theories of the Syntax-Semantics Mismatch;743 25.11.3.1;The Deep Split Structural Isomorphism Hypothesis;743 25.11.3.2;The Natural Language Perfection Hypothesis;746 25.11.3.3;The Imperfections Reflect the Architec
ture of Grammars Hypothesis;747 25.11.4;Shaking Things Up;748 25.11.4.1;How Specified Is Grammatical Meaning?;748 25.11.4.2;Where Does the Meaning Come From?;749 25.11.5;Bibliography;750 25.12;Systematicity;751 25.12.1;Some Varieties of Systematicity;751 25.12.2;Explaining Systematicity;753 25.12.3;Bibliography;754 26;T;756 26.1;Tacit Knowledge;756 26.1.1;The Early Debate;756 26.1.2;Tacit Knowing vs. the Full Propositional Attitudes;756 26.1.3;Tacit Knowing vs. Knowing How;758 26.1.4;What Is Tacit Knowledge?;758 26.1.5;Bibliography;760 26.2;Temporal Logic;760 26.2.1;Tense Logic;760 26.2.1.1;Syntax of Priorean Tense Logic;760 26.2.2;Semantics of Tense Logic;761 26.2.3;Extensions of Tense Logic;762 26.2.3.1;Increasing the Expressive Power: 'Since' and 'Until';762 26.2.3.2;The Indeterminate Future;762 26.2.3.3;Interval Semantics;762 26.2.4;Other Forms of Temporal Logic;763 26.2.5;Bibliography;764 26.3;Tense and Time: Philosophical Aspects;764 26.3.1;Bibliography;766 26.4;Testimony;767 26.4.1;Testimony as a Belief Source;767 26.4.2;Testimony as a Knowledge Source;767 26.4.2.1;Skepticism;767 26.4.2.2;Perception and Understanding;768 26.4.2.3;Reductionism and Anti-reductionism;768 26.4.3;Summary;769 26.4.4;Bibliography;769 26.5;Thought and Language: Philosophical Aspects;770 26.5.1;The Relative Priority of Thought and Language;770 26.5.2;The Cartesian View;771 26.5.3;Behaviorism;772 26.5.4;Sellars: Language as a Precondition for Thought;772 26.5.5;A Closer Look at the Relation between Thought and Language;774 26.5.6;Bibliography;775 26.6;Transformational Grammar: Evolution;775 26.6.1;Early Transformational Grammar;776 26.6.1.1;Harris on Transformations;776 26.6.1.2;Chomsky on Transformations;776 26.6.1.3;Subtypes of Transformations;778 26.6.1.4;Rule Ordering;779 26.6.1.5;Transformations and Mental Processes;780 26.6.2;The 'Standard Theory';780 26.6.2.1;Rule Interaction: the Transformational Cycle;781 26.6.2.2;The Organization of the Grammar;782 26.6.3;Generative Semantics
;783 26.6.4;The Extended Standard Theory;785 26.6.5;The Lexicalist Hypothesis;785 26.6.5.1;Interpretive Semantics;786 26.6.5.2;Constraints on Movement Rules;787 26.6.5.2.1;Structure Preservation;787 26.6.5.2.2;Blind Application of Transformations;788 26.6.5.3;Trace Theory;790 26.6.6;Bibliography;792 26.7;Truth Conditional Semantics and Meaning;793 26.7.1;Bibliography;797 26.8;Truth: Primary Bearers;797 26.8.1;Introduction;797 26.8.2;The Case for the Sentence as the Primary Bearer of Truth-Value;798 26.8.3;Context and the Question of Truth Bearers;798 26.8.4;Ramifications of the Debate about Truth Bearers;799 26.8.5;The Scope of the Issue;799 26.8.6;Bibliography;800 26.9;Truth: Theories of in Philosophy;800 26.9.1;Traditional Theories;800 26.9.2;Deflationary Theories;801 26.9.3;Alternative Theories;803 26.9.4;Bibliography;803 26.10;20th-Century Linguistics: Overview of Trends;803 26.10.1;Introduction;803 26.10.2;20th-Century Linguistics vs. 19th-Century Linguistics: Continuities and Breakthroughs;804 26.10.3;Ferdinand de Saussure;805 26.10.4;Saussurean Trends in Europe;806 26.10.4.1;Geneva School;806 26.10.4.2;Prague School;806 26.10.4.3;Copenhagen School;807 26.10.4.4;Structural Linguistics in France: Benveniste, Martinet;807 26.10.5;Other European Scholars (Guillaume, Tesniegravere, London School);807 26.10.6;American Linguistics from 1920s through 1960s;808 26.10.6.1;Sapir and His Heritage;808 26.10.6.2;Bloomfield;809 26.10.6.3;Post-Bloomfieldian Structuralism;809 26.10.6.4;Tagmemics and Stratificational Grammar;810 26.10.6.5;The Beginnings of Typological Linguistics;810 26.10.7;The Birth and Rise of Generative Grammar;810 26.10.7.1;The Origins of Generative Grammar;810 26.10.7.2;The Standard Theory;811 26.10.7.3;Generative Phonology;811 26.10.8;The Impact of Generative Grammar;812 26.10.9;Trends Stemming from Generative Grammar;813 26.10.9.1;Generative Semantics and Its Heritage;813 26.10.9.2;'One-Level' Approaches to Syntax;813 26.10.9.3;From EST to the 'Minimal
ist Program';814 26.10.10;Trends Alternative to Generative Grammar;814 26.10.10.1;Functionalist Schools;814 26.10.10.2;Typological Linguistics;815 26.10.10.3;Sociolinguistics;815 26.10.10.4;Pragmatics;815 26.10.11;Bibliography;816 26.11;Two-Dimensional Semantics;817 26.11.1;Applications;818 26.11.2;Bibliography;820 26.12;Type versus Token;820 26.12.1;The Distinction;820 26.12.2;Its Usefulness;821 26.12.3;Universals;821 26.12.4;A Related Distinction;821 26.12.5;Do Types Exist?;822 26.12.6;Bibliography;822 27;U;824 27.1;Use Theories of Meaning;824 27.1.1;Bibliography;826 27.2;Use versus Mention;826 27.2.1;Bibliography;828 28;V;830 28.1;Vagueness: Philosophical Aspects;830 28.1.1;Hallmarks of Vagueness;830 28.1.2;Three Philosophical Debates About Vagueness;830 28.1.3;Philosophical Theories of Vagueness;831 28.1.4;Bibliography;832 28.2;Verificationism;833 28.2.1;Introduction;833 28.2.2;The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction;833 28.2.3;Observation Statements;833 28.2.4;Strong Verification;834 28.2.5;Strong Verification and Strong Falsification;834 28.2.6;Weak Verification;834 28.2.7;The Influence of Verificationism;835 28.2.8;Bibliography;835 29;Subject Index;838