Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.
* Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought
* Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us
* Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought
* Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.
* Offers a new answer to the 'motivation question' of how a normative belief motivates an action.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
1. 1 Motivation 1
1. 2 This book 4
Notes 6
2 Ought 8
2. 1 The meaning of 'ought' 8
2. 2 Normative and non-normative oughts 9
2. 3 Owned and unowned oughts 12
2. 4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25
Notes 29
3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31
3. 1 Sidgwick's View 31
3. 2 The need to decide 34
3. 3 Objective and prospective oughts 36
3. 4 Valuing prospects 41
3. 5 Summary 45
Notes 45
4 Reasons 46
4. 1 Introduction and preliminaries 46
4. 2 Pro toto reasons 49
4. 3 Pro tanto reasons 51
4. 4 Most reason 62
4. 5 Ownership of reasons 65
5 Responding to Reasons 71
5. 1 Rationality and responding to reasons 71
5. 2 The quick objection 74
5. 3 Attitudinal reasons 75
5. 4 Sufficiency of reasons 82
Notes 87
6 Responding to Reason-Beliefs 88
6. 1 The Enkratic Condition 88
6. 2 Meeting your own standards 91
6. 3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs 101
6. 4 Conclusion 107
Notes 108
7 Requirements 109
7. 1 Two sorts of requirement 109
7. 2 Property requirements 110
7. 3 Source requirements 116
7. 4 Logic for requirements? 119
7. 5 Ought 126
Notes 129
8 Conditional Requirements 132
8. 1 Application and content 132
8. 2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134
Notes 146
Appendix to Chapter 8 148
9 Synchronic Rationality 149
9. 1 Introduction and method 149
9. 2 Consistency 154
9. 3 Deduction 157
9. 4 Instrumental Rationality 159
9. 5 Enkrasia 170
9. 6 Bayesian requirements 175
Notes 175
10 Diachronic Rationality 177
10. 1 Persistence of Intention 177
10. 2 The rationality of doing as you decide 181
10. 3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185
Notes 69
10. 4 Basing prohibitions and basing permissions 186
Notes 191
11 Rationality and Normativity 192
11. 1 The Normative Question 192
11. 2 More on rationality and reasons 193
11. 3 Is rationality derivatively normative? 197
11. 4 Is rationality non-derivatively normative? 204
Notes 205
12 Higher-Order Reasoning 206
12. 1 The reasoning process 206
12. 2 Reasoning through an intention 210
12. 3 Reasoning with judgement-sensitive attitudes 216
12. 4 One more point 219
Notes 220
13 First-Order Reasoning 221
13. 1 The reasoning process 221
13. 2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for reasoning 225
13. 3 Operating on contents 231
13. 4 Reasoning as activity 235
13. 5 Reasoning at the first order 242
13. 6 The direction of reasoning 243
13. 7 Correct belief reasoning 246
Notes 248
14 Practical Reasoning 250
14. 1 Reasoning with attitudes other than beliefs 250
14. 2 Correctness 255
14. 3 Choosing a means 261
14. 4 Hypothesizing 264
Notes 265
15 Explicit Reasoning 267
15. 1 Markers 267
15. 2 Bayesian and expressivist reasoning 275
15. 3 Reasoning with absences 278
15. 4 Theoretical and practical reasoning 281
15. 5 Intention reasoning with other markers 285
Notes 286
16 Enkratic Reasoning 288
16. 1 Enkratic reasoning 288
16. 2 Humean objections 291
16. 3 Conclusion 294
Notes 294
Bibliography 295
Index 303