This is a new Wittgensteinian account of the American Constitution that provides a fresh perspective on how judges can follow a legal document written in flexible language. The book shows why originalism is incompatible with the American legal system and challenges the views of Ronald Dworkin and numerous law professors.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Chapter 1: Wittgenstein, Law and Originalism
Part I: Interpreting the Constitution
Chapter 2: Obeying Flexible Commands
Chapter 3: Is There a Fixed Meaning?
Chapter 4: Public Meaning v. Meaning as Use
Chapter 5: The Flexible Constitution
Chapter 6: Structuralism and Polysemy
Chapter 7: Law as Connoisseur Judgment
Part II: Understanding Originalism
Chapter 8: The Philosophy of Framers' Intent
Chapter 9: Why Framers' Intent is Flawed
Chapter 10: The New Originalism
Chapter 11: The Constitution as Old Society
Chapter 12: Cultural Construction
Chapter 13: What Originalism Really Is
Appendix: The Philosophical Investigation