Based on primary sources, this book examines the 1995 Dayton Peace agreement, which ended the fighting in Bosnia, to show how American decision-making works on a complex issue. It takes a multidisciplinary approach and highlights both the capabilities and limitations of intelligence in the American foreign policy process.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Foreword: Navigating from War to Peace: Enduring Challenges for Presidents and Citizens, Jonathan R. Alger
Chapter 1: The Historical and Bureaucratic Context of the Declassified Documents, Timothy R. Walton
Chapter 2: Beyond Bosnia: Ethnical Reasoning in Political Deliberations about Humanitarian Intervention, Pia Antolic-Piper, William Hawk, David McGraw, and Mark Piper
Chapter 3: New Lessons from the War in Bosnia - An Analysis Using Computational Methods, Anamaria Berea
Chapter 4: Conflict Frames and the Timing of U.S. Intervention in Bosnia, John Hulsey and John A. Scherpereel
Chapter 5: Analytic Intelligence and Bosnia Policymaking in the Clinton Administration, Steven L. Burg
Chapter 6: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy toward Bosnia, 1993-95: National Identity, Credibility, and the 'Stalemate Machine', Bernd Kaussler, Jonathan Keller, and Yi Edward Yang
Chapter 7: Towards a New Social Memory of the Bosnian Genocide: Countering Al-Qaeda's Radicalization Myth with the CIA "Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency" Archive, Frances Flannery
Chapter 8: The Impact of Intelligence on DOD Perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict, 1995, Jonathan Smith
Chapter 9: Fallen Off the Priority List: Was Srebrenica an Intelligence Failure?, Bob De Graaff and Cees Wiebes
Chapter 10: The Compromises Necessary to Get the Final Deal, Timothy R. Walton
Appendix: Principles Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993