Evidence, Proof, and Facts

Preface; Table of Works Represented, with Abbreviations Used; Evidence, Proof, and Facts: Introductory Essay; 1. The Concept of Evidence and the Law of Evidence; SECTION 1: WHAT IS EVIDENCE?; Bentham, Rationale; Schum, Foundations; SECTION 2: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise; Holdsworth, History; Twining, Rethinking Evidence; SECTION 3: ARE EXCLUSIONARY RULES OF EVIDENCE NEEDED?; Bentham, Rationale; Stephen, Report; SECTION 4: THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: OPTIMISTIC RATIONALISM; Twining, Theories; 2. Logic and Rhetoric; SECTION 1: LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE REASONING, AND THE SYLLOGISM; Aristotle, Topics; Aristotle, Prior Analytics; Mill, System; SECTION 2: REJECTION OF THE SYLLOGISM AS A SCIENTIFIC METHOD; Bacon, Novum Organum; Hume, Enquiry; Schum, Foundations; SECTION 3: LOGIC, INDUCTIVE REASONING, AND INFERENCES FROM EVIDENCE; Schmidt, The Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the Development of Logic; Mill, System; SECTION 4: LOGICAL FALLACIES; Mill, System; SECTION 5: DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC; Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric; Plato, Gorgias; Plato, Phaedrus; 3. Judicial Reasoning About Facts; SECTION 1: RELEVANCE; Stephen, Digest; US Federal Rule of Evidence 401; Bentham, Rationale; Schum, Foundations; Keynes, Treatise; SECTION 2: DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Bentham, Rationale; SECTION 3: THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL REASONING; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise; Wigmore, Science; SECTION 4: PROBATIVE VALUE AND WEIGHT; Bentham, Rationale; Keynes, Treatise; SECTION 5: GENERALIZATIONS; Hume, Enquiry; Bentham, Rationale; Mill, System; 4. Causation; SECTION 1: PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT; Aristotle, Physics; Locke, Essay; Hume, Treatise; Hume, Enquiry; Mill, System; SECTION 2: CAUSE AND EFFECT AS BASIS FOR INFERENCE FROM EVIDENCE; Hart and Honore, Causation; Schum, Foundations; SECTION 3: LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF CAUSATION; Hart and Honore, Causation; 5. The Standard of Proof; SECTION 1: RELATIONSHIP OF INDUCTIVE REASONING TO STANDARDS OF PROOF; Cohen, The Probable and the Provable; SECTION 2: PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE; Rhesa Shipping Co SA v. Edmunds (The Popi M); T.N.T. Management Pty. Ltd. v. Brooks; Cohen, The Probable and the Provable; SECTION 3: PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Cohen, The Probable and the Provable; SECTION 4: DECISION THEORY IN RELATION TO STANDARDS OF PROOF; Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process; 6. Theories of Probability; SECTION 1: PROBABILITY THEORIES GENERALLY; Locke, Essay; Hume, Treatise; Bentham, Rationale; Keynes, Treatise; SECTION 2: PROBABILITY APPLIED TO HUMAN CONDUCT AND CREDIBILITY; Keynes, Treatise; Eggleston, Evidence, Proof, and Probability; SECTION 3: THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIFFERENCE; Cohen, Introduction; 7. Probability: Issues of Mathematics; SECTION 1: MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY CALCULUS; Mill, System; Schum, Foundations; Cohen, Introduction; SECTION 2: REVISION OF PROBABILITY ESTIMATES IN LIGHT OF NEW EVIDENCE: BAYES' RULE; Schum, Foundations; Bayes, Essay; SECTION 3: MATHEMATICS IN THE COURTROOM; People v. Collins; R v. Adams (No. 2); 8. Probability: Mathematical and Non-Mathematical Models; SECTION 1: MON-MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY MODELS; Mill, System; Keynes, Treatise; Cohen, Introduction; Cohen, The Probable and the Provable; SECTION 2: PASCAL OR BACON? THE GREAT DEBATE; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process; Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Laws of the Land; 9. Alternative Epistemologies of Evidence; SECTION 1: CHANCE AND ACAUSAL CONNECTIONS; Aristotle, Physics; Mill, System; SECTION 2: THE OLDER MODES OF PROOF; Holdsworth, History; Hammurabi, Code; Manu, Laws; Supakar, The Law of Evidence in Ancient India; SECTION 3: A WOMAN'S PERSPECTIVE; Harmon, Etchings on Glass; APPENDIX 1: INFERENCE NETWORKS AND THE CHARTING OF EVIDENCE; Wigmore, The Problem of Proof; APPENDIX 2: SOME COMMONLY USED HYPOTHETICALS; Index

Peter Murphy is Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law and currently Defence Counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. He is Editor-in-Chief of Blackstone's Criminal Practice and author of Murphy on Evidence (Blackstone, 2000).