In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games this book is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of stra
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1 The theory of managerial firms: setting the stage
1. 1 Of firms and markets
1. 2 U-form vs M-form, and opportunistic behaviour
1. 3 Asset specificity, moral hazard and vertical integration
1. 4 What does a firm maximize?
1. 4. 1 The theory of the growth of the firm
1. 5 Agency theory
1. 5. 1 Moral hazard in teams
1. 6 Market competition and incentives
2 Strategic delegation in oligopoly
2. 1 Sales expansion
2. 1. 1 Cournot competition
2. 1. 2 Bertrand competition
2. 2 Market shares
2. 3 Comparative performance
2. 3. 1 Cournot competition
2. 3. 2 Bertrand competition and the mixed case
2. 4 All eggs in one basket
2. 4. 1 Output level vs comparative performance
2. 4. 2 Market share vs comparative performance
2. 4. 3 Output level vs market share
2. 4. 4 The reduced form
2. 5 Endogenous timing
2. 5. 1 Managers choose timing
2. 5. 2 Owners choose timing
2. 6 Entry barriers
2. 7 Empirical and experimental evidence
3 Mixed oligopolies
3. 1 Strategic delegation and asymmetric information
3. 2 Strategic delegation without agency issues
3. 3 Delegation and tax policy
4 Collusive behaviour and horizontal mergers
4. 1 Stock-based compensation and collusion
4. 2 Output-based compensation and collusion
4. 2. 1 Extension: partial collusion with grim trigger strategies or optimal punishment
4. 3 Horizontal mergers
5 Divisionalization and vertical relations
5. 1 Vertical separation: supply chain management
5. 2 Multidivisional firms
5. 2. 1 Multidivisionalization with managers
5. 2. 2 Divisionalization and mergers. . . /part contents