If we are skeptical about the truth of religious or moral belief, what should we do about those ways of talking and thinking? According to the fictionalist, they provide pragmatic benefits that do not depend on their truth. This volume examines religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Introducion
- 1: James Lenman: Reasons for pretending and pretend reasons
- 2: Jessica Isserow: Should moral error theorists make do with make-believe
- 3: Jonas Olson and Victor Moberger: Moral fictionalism: How and why?
- 4: François Jaquet: Moral fictionalism and misleading analogies
- 5: Graham Oppy: Religious fictionalism
- 6: Bradley Armour-Garb and Frederick Kroon: The pretensions of religious fictionalism
- 7: Mary Leng: Is the Pope Catholic? Religious fictionalism and the hazards of belief
- 8: Michael Scott: Religious fictionalism: Strategies and obstacles
- 9: Natalja Deng: The contours of religious fictionalism
- 10: Robin Le Poidevin: Should moral fictionalists be religious fictionalists (or vice versa)?
- 11: Seahwa Kim: Do we have reason to adopt religious fictionalism or moral fictionalism?
- 12: Stuart Brock: Revolutionary moral fictionalism and the problem of imaginative failure
- 13: Richard Joyce: Yes to moral fictionalism; no to religious fictionalism