A book about Aristotle's rejection of Plato's doctrine of the Form of the Good. It argues that, according to Aristotle, when we generalize from virtues to goodness, we wrongly form a presumption of univocity which, even if defensible in some cases, is indefensible in the general case.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Preface
- 1: A View of a View of the Good
- 2: Two Views of a View of a View of the Good
- 3: A Series of Goods
- 4: Goodness Across the Categories
- 5: The Diversity of Sciences
- 6: Goodness Itself
- 7: Intrinsic Goods Alone: A Platonic Riposte
- 8: Normative Considerations Reintroduced
- 9: Good, Bad, Better, Worse
- 10: Goodness qua Goodness: A Concluding Scientific Postscript?
- Bibliography