Many worldviews assume that God exists and is the greatest possible being. Religious traditions, philosophical arguments, and billions of believers hold that God is perfectly good, all-knowing, and all-powerful. This book argues that this worldview is false. It provides four arguments for this conclusion that build on the philosophy of religion and moral responsibility literatures in original and insightful ways:
Impossibility: God is not responsible because responsibility itself is impossible. No one-including God-can satisfy the conditions necessary for moral responsibility.
Compulsion: God is not responsible because his perfect nature compels his choices. A being whose psychology necessarily determines his actions cannot be responsible for them.
Arbitrariness: God is not responsible because his choices would be arbitrary. No one is responsible for making arbitrary choices, even if those choices are between good options.
Maximal Greatness: If God lacks responsibility, then his greatness depends on being uniquely and maximally benevolent, but no one can satisfy this requirement.
There is no other book that argues against God's existence by systematically examining whether God can be morally responsible and showing how these arguments undermine the greatest possible being thesis. The book's arguments connecting divine psychology, foreknowledge, and responsibility are new to the literature. Ultimately, the book's conclusions challenge our understanding of God, morality, and the metaphysical structure of the universe.
God Collapses: Theism and Moral Responsibility is essential reading for scholars and graduate students in philosophy, religious studies, and theology who are interested in debates about divine attributes, moral responsibility, and arguments for atheism.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Table of Contents
Introduction
Part One. If God exists, then he is the greatest possible being
Chapter One: Greatness
Chapter Two: Greatest Possible Being
Chapter Three: Maximal Greatness and Responsibility
Chapter Four: Greatness and Self-Explanation
Part Two. The greatest possible being is not significantly responsible
Chapter Five: Basic Responsibility-Maker
Chapter Six: Blameworthiness
Chapter Seven: Responsibility and Value
Chapter Eight: God and Responsibility
Chapter Nine: Divine Foreknowledge
Chapter Ten: The Benevolence-Responsibility Tradeoff
Part Three. The greatest possible being is not insignificantly responsible
Chapter Eleven: Insignificant Responsibility
Chapter Twelve: Universe Creation
Part Four. The greatest possible being does not lack responsibility
Chapter Thirteen: Arbitrary Benevolence
Part Five: Conclusion
Chapter Fourteen: Conclusion
Part Six: Appendix: On the Best Possible World
Index
Bibliography