The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays.
The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts.
The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind.
The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
The Origins of These Essays ix Introduction 1 Part One: Presupposition 21<lr> Essay One: A Projection Problem for Speaker Presuppositions 23 Essay Two: Presupposition 73 Part Two: Language and Linguistic Competence 131 Essay Three: Linguistics and Psychology 133 Essay Four: Semantics and Psychology 159 Essay Five: Semantics and Semantic Competence 182 Essay Six: The Necessity Argument 202 Essay Seven: Truth, Meaning, and Understanding 208 Essay Eight: Truth and Meaning--in Perspective 225 Part Three: Semantics and Pragmatics 249 Essay Nine: Naming and Asserting 251 Essay Ten: The Gap between Meaning and Assertion: Why What We Literally Say Often Differs from What Our Words Literally Mean 278 Essay Eleven: Drawing the Line between Meaning and Implicature--and Relating Both to Assertion 298 Part Four: Descriptions 327 Essay Twelve: Incomplete Definite Descriptions 329 Essay Thirteen: Donnellan's Referential/Attributive Distinction 360 Essay Fourteen: Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions Do Not Defeat Russell's Theory of Descriptions 377 Part Five: Meaning and Use: Lessons for Legal Interpretation 401 Essay Fifteen: Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law 403 Index 425