The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays.
The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts.
The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind.
The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
The Origins of These Essays ix Introduction 1 Part One: Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes 31 Essay One: Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33 Essay Two: Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72 Essay Three: Belief and Mental Representation 81 Essay Four: Attitudes and Anaphora 111 Part Two: Modality 137 Essay Five: The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139 Essay Six: The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165 Essay Seven: Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189 Essay Eight: Understanding Assertion 211 Essay Nine: Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243 Essay Ten: Actually 277 Part Three: Truth and Vagueness 301 Essay Eleven: What Is a Theory of Truth? 303 Essay Twelve: Understanding Deflationism 323 Essay Thirteen: Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340 Essay Fourteen: The Possibility of Partial Definition 362 Part Four: Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule 383 Essay Fifteen: Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385 Essay Sixteen: Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416 Index 457