"Tushnet puts flesh on the bones of the claim that constitutionally guaranteed social rights, judicially enforced, are already a part of the jurisprudence of the United States and other countries of interest. He takes this argument some distance beyond where any other scholar has taken it, so far as I know, and he does so with considerable refinement. This book gives a full and strong manifestation of the style, intelligence, and learning that have earned Tushnet his eminence as a scholar of American constitutional law and comparative constitutionalism."--Frank I. Michelman, Harvard Law School
"This is an important contribution to an important debate in the United States about the possibility and prospects for the courts to play a more modest role in politics and policy. Tushnet demonstrates that, by a nice twist, a more modest judicial role could lead to a more robust set of social rights. And his comparative cases show that this is not purely theoretical, but that it has worked out to some degree in other systems."--Gordon Silverstein, University of California, Berkeley
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface ix Acknowledgments xv Part I: Strong-Form and Weak-Form Judicial Review Chapter 1: Why Comparative Constitutional Law? 3 Chapter 2: Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 18 Chapter 3: The Possible Instability of Weak-Form Review and Its Implications 43 Part II: Legislative Responsibility for Enforcing the Constitution Chapter 4: Why and How to Evaluate Constitutional Performance 79 Chapter 5: Constitutional Decision Making Outside the Courts 111 Part III: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights Chapter 6: The State Action Doctrine and Social and Economic Rights 161 Chapter 7: Structures of Judicial Review, Horizontal Effect, and Social Welfare Rights 196 Chapter 8: Enforcing Social and Economic Rights 227 Table of Cases 265 Index 269