We All Lost the Cold War

<TR>Preface<TR>Abbreviations<TR>Ch. 1Introduction3<TR>Pt. 1The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962<TR>Ch. 2Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives19<TR>Ch. 3Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics51<TR>Ch. 4Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?67<TR>Ch. 5Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis?94<TR>Ch. 6The Crisis and Its Resolution110<TR>Pt. 2The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973<TR>Ch. 7The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973149<TR>Ch. 8The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts182<TR>Ch. 9The Failure to Stop the Fighting198<TR>Ch. 10The Failure to Avoid Confrontation226<TR>Ch. 11The Crisis and Its Resolution261<TR>Pt. 3Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold War<TR>Ch. 12How Crises Are Resolved291<TR>Ch. 13Deterrence and Crisis Management324<TR>Ch. 14Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons348<TR>Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War369<TR>Notes377<TR>Appendix523<TR>Name Index527<TR>General Index535

The orthodoxy . . . is that deterrence worked and the arms race defeated the Soviet Union. Hitherto there has been little dissent from those positions, apart from those 'revisionist' historians who merely turned the whole orthodoxy on its head. . . . Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein are not revisionists in that sense. They are far too sensible for emotional nonsense of that kind. Yet their work is quite as unorthodox, probably as shocking to the closed corporation of Cold War 'scholars' but much more surprising than that of the Chomskyans.