Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
<TR>Preface<TR>Abbreviations<TR>Ch. 1Introduction3<TR>Pt. 1The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962<TR>Ch. 2Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives19<TR>Ch. 3Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics51<TR>Ch. 4Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?67<TR>Ch. 5Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis?94<TR>Ch. 6The Crisis and Its Resolution110<TR>Pt. 2The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973<TR>Ch. 7The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973149<TR>Ch. 8The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts182<TR>Ch. 9The Failure to Stop the Fighting198<TR>Ch. 10The Failure to Avoid Confrontation226<TR>Ch. 11The Crisis and Its Resolution261<TR>Pt. 3Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold War<TR>Ch. 12How Crises Are Resolved291<TR>Ch. 13Deterrence and Crisis Management324<TR>Ch. 14Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons348<TR>Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War369<TR>Notes377<TR>Appendix523<TR>Name Index527<TR>General Index535
